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Abstract
The Algebraic Eraser has been gaining prominence as SecureRF,
the company commercializing the algorithm, increases its marketing
reach. The scheme is claimed to be well-suited to IoT applications
but a lack of detail in available documentation has hampered peer-
review. Recently more details of the system have emerged after a tag
authentication protocol built using the Algebraic Eraser was proposed
for standardization in ISO/IEC SC31 and SecureRF provided an open
public description of the protocol. In this paper we describe a range
of attacks on this protocol that include very efficient and practical tag
impersonation as well as partial, and total, tag secret key recovery.
Most of these results have been practically verified, they contrast with
the 80-bit security that is claimed for the protocol, and they emphasize
the importance of independent public review for any cryptographic
proposal.
Keywords: Algebraic Eraser, cryptanalysis, tag authentication,
IoT.
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1 Introduction
Extending security features to RAIN RFID tags1 and other severely con-
strained devices in the Internet of Things is not easy. However the different
pieces of the deployment puzzle are falling into place. Over-the-air (OTA)
commands supporting security features have now been standardized [11] and
both tag and reader manufacturers can build to these specifications knowing
that interoperability will follow. The OTA commands themselves are crypto-
agnostic so parallel work on a range of cryptographic interfaces, so-called
cryptographic suites, is ongoing within ISO/IEC SC31. These cryptographic
suites provide the detailed specifications that allow algorithms such as the
AES [23, 14], PRESENT-80 [8, 15], and Grain-128a [1, 16] to be used on
even the most basic of RFID devices.
For symmetric cryptography a range of lighter alternatives to the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) [23] have received a high level of crypt-
analytic attention over several years. While the AES will always be an im-
portant implementation option, some of these alternative algorithms may be
appropriate for certain use-cases. To those not in the field the cost and per-
formance advantages provided by these new algorithms might appear slight.
But the requirements of the RAIN RFID market are such that even a minor
degradation in the read range or a small percentage increase in silicon price
can eliminate the business case for adding security to many use-cases.
Turning to asymmetric cryptography there are several work items in
ISO/IEC 29167 that describe public-key solutions. Parts 29167-12 [17] and
29167-16 [18] describe tag authentication based on elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy, though they carry significant implementation challenges for RAIN
RFID. 29167-17 [19] provides another elliptic-curve tag authentication solu-
tion with the additional property that compact pre-computed coupons can
be used to provide implementation advantages. In 29167-20 [20], however,
we encounter an alternative to elliptic curves: 29167-20 proposes a method
for asymmetric tag authentication that is based on braid groups. This pro-
posal is based on the Algebraic Eraser (AE) key agreement protocol [3, 25].
SecureRF, the company commercializing (and owning the trademark to) the
Algebraic Eraser, claims significant implementation advantages for the Alge-
1Following the creation of the RAIN Industry Alliance, UHF RFID tags are increasingly
branded as RAIN RFID tags. These RFID tags operate at 860–960 MHz and are far more
constrained than the HF RFID tags that are familiar from public transport and NFC
applications.
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braic Eraser over solutions that use elliptic curves. In particular the Algebraic
Eraser is claimed to be well-suited to deployments as part of the Internet of
Things.
Note The Algebraic Eraser has been proposed for use in many environ-
ments. However the commentary and descriptions in this paper will use the
typical RFID setting of an Interrogator (or reader) interacting with a Tag.
This provides the closest match with the terms used in the protocol [25].
Related work
Until recently, crucial details about the Algebraic Eraser and any associated
cryptographic protocol were not available. This made independent security
analysis and performance evaluation difficult. (See [12, 13, 21, 22, 24] for
what little exists in the published literature.) However, in October 2015
SecureRF provided a detailed public description of the Algebraic Eraser tag
authentication protocol [9, 25]. This means that the protocol can now be
publicly reviewed and discussed. The published description includes a specific
set of system parameters, a set of test vectors, and a description of the tag
authentication protocol. However SecureRF do not disclose how the system
parameters were generated, an aspect of the technology that is known to be
of crucial importance. Indeed, some of the attacks in this paper are able
to exploit structure in the system parameters that have been proposed for
standardization.
While general documentation [3] describes the Algebraic Eraser in terms
of braid groups, company presentations [4, 6] distance the technology from
previous cryptographic proposals that use braid groups. Instead the security
of the Algebraic Eraser is said to depend on a problem called the simultaneous
conjugacy separation search problem [4] and sample parameter sizes have been
published for different security levels. In [25] the parameters are claimed to
correspond to an 80-bit security level, though a precise security model is not
provided. Most likely the intention is that the work effort to recover a private
key from the corresponding public key should be roughly equivalent to 280
operations.
The tag authentication protocol in [25] is based upon a Diffie–Hellman-
like key agreement scheme. Very recently Ben-Zvi, Blackburn, and Tsaban [7]
presented an innovative cryptanalysis of the underlying key agreement pro-
3
tocol.2 Using only information that is exchanged over the air, and avoiding
the hard problem upon which the security of the Algebraic Eraser key agree-
ment protocol is claimed to be based, Ben-Zvi et al. provide a method for
deriving the shared secret key. Using non-optimized implementations they
successfully recovered—in under eight hours—the shared secrets generated
using the Algebraic Eraser key agreement protocol with parameters provided
by SecureRF that were intended to provide 128-bit security [6].
Since then Anshel, Atkins, Goldfeld and Gunnells (researchers associ-
ated with SecureRF) have posted a technical response [2] to the Ben-Zvi–
Blackburn–Tsaban (BBT) attack. This is not the place to comment on that
document, except to highlight one feature that is relevant for our work here.
In [2] Anshel et al. consider the implications of the BBT attack and
state that the attack would not apply to one of two profiles proposed for
standardization [20]. Section 4.2 of Anshel et al. [2] reveals that the profile
claimed to be secure is one where “... an attacker never has access to one of
the public keys ...” [2]. However the idea that it is reasonable for the security
of a public key scheme to depend on the public key being hidden is very
strange. While it is true Tag public keys could be delivered to interrogators
out-of-band, the security of the scheme should not depend on the Interrogator
keeping those keys secret. Indeed, if we trust an Interrogator not to reveal
the Tag public key then we can trust the Interrogator with a symmetric key
and there would be no need to use the Algebraic Eraser at all! So while
two of the five attacks described in this paper use the Tag public key for the
required calculations, we see no limitation in assuming that the tag public
key is, as the name implies, public.
Finally, we should point out a recent posting of Atkins and Goldfeld [5]
that suggests modifications to the tag authentication protocol in the light of
the results of this paper.
Our contribution
In this work we derive a range of new and very efficient attacks on the tag
authentication protocol [25]. We side-step the bulk of the mathematical ma-
chinery behind the Algebraic Eraser, but observe some curious features of
the Algebraic Eraser that cause significant failures in this protocol. In par-
ticular we provide the following attacks against the variant that is currently
2The results in this paper are entirely independent of the work in Ben-Zvi et al [7].
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proposed for standardization:
1. Tag impersonation of a target tag with success probability ≈ 2−7 after
273 queries against the target tag and storage ≈ 216 bits.
2. Tag impersonation of a target tag with 100% success rate after ≈ 215
queries against the target tag and using ≈ 223 bits of storage.
3. Full recovery of a tag private key matrix (see Section 3.3) with negligible
work after running the tag authentication protocol 33 times against the
target tag.
4. Tag impersonation of a target tag with 100% success rate, using At-
tack 3 and a small pre-computed look-up table of around 128 64-bit
words. The on-line work in the attack is negligible while the off-line
pre-computation for current parameter sizes is also negligible. This at-
tack uses (a non-heuristic part of) an attack due to Kalka, Teicher and
Tsaban [21] together with a novel application of a certain permutation
group algorithm.
5. Complete tag private key (or equivalent key) recovery—recovering both
the tag private matrix and the secret tag conjugate set (see Section 3.3)—
building on Attack 3 and requiring a work effort of 249 operations and
storage ≈ 248 64-bit words for one of the parameter choices proposed
for standardization that is claimed to provide 80-bit security.
Our attacks avoid using any heuristic methods, and apply for all parameter
sets of the size proposed in the standard (not just the specific given param-
eters). These failures in the tag authentication protocol severely undermine
claims for an 80-bit security level. We conclude that the protocol is unsuit-
able for both deployment and standardization in its current form.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview of
the Algebraic Eraser tag authentication protocol with the mathematical for-
malities following in Section 3. The attacks are described in Sections 4, 5, 6,
and 7 respectively and we close the paper with our conclusions.
2 Algebraic Eraser and tag authentication
The Algebraic Eraser does not use familiar mathematics and a description
can be, at first sight, somewhat complicated. However, for our attacks we will
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Interrogator Tag
secret key Intpriv secret key Tagpriv
public key Intpub public key Tagpub
Request Tag public key/
start−−−−−−−→
certificate
Tagpub←−−−−−−−−− Send Tag public key
Send Interrogator public key,
Intpub, s, l−−−−−−−−−−−−→
index, and token bit length
Compute secret using Intpriv Compute secret using Tagpriv
Check correctness of t
t←−−−− Using index s and length l
extract and return token t
Table 1: An outline of the Algebraic Eraser tag authentication scheme [25].
The underlying key agreement protocol is used to derive a shared secret. The
Interrogator instructs the Tag, using byte index s and bit-length l, to extract
an authentication token t of length l from this shared secret.
only need the basic tools that we provide in Section 3. For a more complete
view the reader is referred to both the general description of the Algebraic
Eraser [3] and the specific protocol details in [25].
As mentioned in the Introduction, at the core of the Algebraic Eraser is
a key agreement protocol. Using the familiar protocol flow that dates back
to Diffie–Hellman [10], an Interrogator and Tag exchange public keys. Then,
by each applying their own secret component to the other public key, both
Interrogator and Tag can arrive at a shared common secret key value. To
turn this key agreement protocol into a tag authentication protocol, the In-
terrogator specifies a portion of the shared secret that should be returned by
the Tag. The correctness of this response can be verified by the Interrogator.
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This is illustrated in Table 1 and described more technically in Section 3.4.
We will refer to the portion of the secret key returned by the Tag as an
authentication token t. In [25] the Interrogator indicates to the Tag how to
construct t by sending a starting index s and length l during the message
exchange between Interrogator and Tag. The protocol description neither
specifies nor gives guidelines on s and l. Clearly a fake tag will always be
able to fool an Interrogator with probability 2−l but the field specifying the
length l in [25] is eight bits long so we have 0 ≤ l ≤ 255. This certainly
covers all the natural choices. Note that generating an authentication token
t by revealing parts of a shared secret means that the Interrogator will need
to generate and use different public keys at each tag authentication. While
this is alluded to in Section B.1.2 of [25] it is unclear whether the ensuing
performance penalty in storage and transaction time is always reflected in
published performance figures.
3 Some technical details
This section reviews some of the technical details of the protocol. We describe
only as much of the detail as we need to describe our attacks.
3.1 System parameters
The protocol specifies some system parameters, the key space, as follows.
Let N be a small positive integer; [25] mandates that N = 10. Let
B = {b1, b2, . . . , bN−1} be an alphabet of size N − 1 (the bi are known as
Artin generators). Let F be the set of all formal strings in the disjoint union
B ∪B−1. So, for example, b2b−11 b1b4b−12 is a length 5 element of F .
The set of Tag conjugates is a set C = {c1, c2, . . . , c32} of size 32, where
each ci ∈ F . The set of Interrogator conjugates is a set D = {d1, d2, . . . , d32}
of size 32, where each di ∈ F . While C and D are specified in [25] SecureRF
does not describe how they have been generated. In fact, in Section 4 we will
exploit an important structural property of the sets C and D that have been
proposed for standardization. Here, however, we restrict ourselves to noting
that each of C and D require around 90 Kbits to store and that while a tag
might not need to store C the Interrogator needs D to generate ephemeral
keys.
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We write Sym(N) for the set of all permutations ofN objects {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Let si = (i, i+ 1) ∈ Sym(N) be the permutation that swaps i and i+ 1 and
leaves the remaining elements fixed. Let
w = b1i1 b
2
i2
· · · brir
be an element in F of length r, where ij ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N−1} and j ∈ {−1, 1}.
The permutation pi(w) ∈ Sym(N) corresponding to w ∈ F is the permutation
pi(w) = s1i1s
2
i2
· · · srir = si1si2 · · · sir
where product means composition of permutations.
Finally, the protocol [25] specifies using arithmetic in the finite field F256
and defines a specific sequence of N = 10 non-zero elements in F256, called
T-values, and a specific N ×N matrix M∗ with entries in F256 called a seed
matrix. This choice of parameter sizes is denoted B10F256 and, according to
Section B.3, is intended to provide 80-bit security.
Another set of parameters, denoted B16F256, has been independently
provided by SecureRF to the first author. The same underlying field is
used for both parameter sets but the matrices, the set of T-values, and the
permutations are defined for N = 16 rather than N = 10. The parameters
B16F256 are intended to provide 128-bit security.
3.2 E-multiplication
E-multiplication is the public key operation, analogous to finite field expo-
nentiation in Diffie–Hellmann, that lies at the heart of the Algebraic Eraser.
It takes two parameters as input. The first parameter is a pair (M,σ) where
M is an N × N matrix over F256 and σ ∈ Sym(N) is a permutation. The
second parameter is a string w ∈ F . The output is a pair (M ′, σ′) where M ′
is an N ×N matrix over F256 and σ′ ∈ Sym(N). We write
(M,σ) ∗ w = (M ′, σ′).
The permutation σ′ is easy to define: σ′ = σ pi(w). The matrix M ′ is com-
puted by first finding a certain N × N matrix φ(σ,w) with entries in F256,
and then setting M ′ = Mφ(σ,w). We do not specify the details of how
φ(σ,w) is defined, but just give the following details. To compute φ(σ,w),
we replace the symbols bi and b
−1
i in w by certain fixed matrices and their
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inverses. These matrices have entries in a polynomial ring in N variables,
and the last row of all these matrices is all zero apart from the final entry
which is 1. We multiply our matrices together (obtaining a matrix whose
last row is all zero apart from the final entry which is 1). We evaluate each
entry of this product (which is a ratio of two polynomials in N variables)
by replacing each variable by one of the T -values to form the matrix φ(σ,w)
with entries in F256. We use σ to decide which T -value replaces each variable
in this process.
We note four properties that follow from the way E-multiplication is de-
fined:
1. If w is the concatenation of strings w′ and w′′ then
(M,σ) ∗ w = ((M,σ) ∗ w′) ∗ w′′. (1)
In fact E-multiplication has other nice properties related to the fact that
E-multiplication is derived from the action of a braid group. However
we do not need these properties here.
2. The matrix φ(σ,w) only depends on σ and w (and on the T-values,
which are fixed).
3. The entries of the last row of φ(σ,w) are all zero, except the final entry
which is 1.
4. The following linearity property follows from our partial description of
E-multiplication:
If (M1, σ) ∗ w = (M ′1, σ′) and (M2, σ) ∗ w = (M ′2, σ′)
then (a1M1 ⊕ a2M2, σ) ∗ w = (a1M ′1 ⊕ a2M ′2, σ′)
(2)
for any a1, a2 ∈ F256.
3.3 Private and public keys
The Tag private key has two components.
1. The first component is an N × N matrix KT over F256 that is gen-
erated from the seed matrix M∗. During the key generation process
a random degree 9 polynomial p(x) over F256 is selected and we set
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KT = p(M∗). See Section B.1.2 of [25]. The parameters are chosen so
that the probability of recovering KT by guessing the polynomial p(x)
is (2−8)10 = 2−80.
2. The second component of the private key is a string c ∈ F that is ob-
tained by concatenating at least 16 of the Tag conjugates and their in-
verses. (The inverse of a word b1i1 b
2
i2
· · · brir is the word b−rir b−r−1ir−1 · · · b−1i1 .)
The matrix KT and the string c form the private key of the Tag. The Tag’s
public key is defined to be
(MT , σT ) = (KT , 1) ∗ c
where 1 is the identity permutation.
When interacting with the Tag, the Interrogator generates an ephemeral
private and public key, using the set of Interrogator conjugates rather than
Tag conjugates. This means that the Interrogator’s private key is an N ×N
matrix KI over F256 and a concatenation d of at least 16 of the Interrogator
conjugates and their inverses. The Interrogator’s public key is
(MI , σI) = (KI , 1) ∗ d.
3.4 Authenticating a tag
The Tag authentication protocol runs as follows. The Interrogator requests
the Tag’s public key (MT , σT ). The Interrogator also generates an ephemeral
private key and sends the corresponding public key (MI , σI) to the Tag. The
Tag computes the shared key
(KTMI , σI) ∗ c
and the Interrogator computes the shared key
(KIMT , σT ) ∗ d.
The function φ and the parameters of the scheme are designed so that these
values are equal. The Interrogator requests that part of the shared key be
returned to the Interrogator and authenticates the Tag if the Tag replies cor-
rectly. Though the shared key is a matrix-permutation pair, the permutation
is easy to compute from public material (it is just a product of two public
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permutations: σIσT = σTσI). So the matrix is the only non-public part of
the shared key.
We note that all the attacks in this paper use knowledge of the shared
secret key generated during the tag authentication protocol. It is a minor
detail, but since [25] restricts the length of the authentication token (l ≤ 255)
an attacker might need to repeat tag authentication using three different
choices for s and l = 255 before recovering the entire shared secret (as the
shared matrix is represented by a sequence of 8×N(N−1) = 720 bits). This
three-fold increase in the work effort is included in our estimates.
4 Basic tag impersonation
In a tag authentication protocol, an attacker can always run the tag authen-
tication protocol against a target tag at will. The goal would be to derive
enough information so that the attacker can impersonate the target tag to a
genuine Interrogator in a future run of the tag authentication protocol. We
now describe a simple impersonation attack of this type.
Suppose an attacker chooses a permutation σ and a set of matrices Mi,
for 0 ≤ i ≤ N(N − 1) = 90. The matrices are chosen so that they form
a basis for the space of all N × N F256 matrices for which the last row
begins with N − 1 zero values. Taken together, the matrices and the single
permutation σ provide N(N − 1) + 1 = 91 spoof Interrogator public keys
that are used in 91 runs of the tag authentication protocol against the target
Tag. This yields 91 shared secrets Si, for 0 ≤ i ≤ N(N − 1), remembering
from Section 3.4 that we will need to include a further factor of three in any
work effort computation.
Now suppose the attacker attempts to impersonate the target Tag to a
genuine Interrogator and receives a random public key (MI , σI), where σI =
σ. Emulating the target Tag, the attacker computes ai for 0 ≤ i ≤ N(N−1),
so that
MI =
N(N−1)⊕
i=0
aiMi.
The linearity observed in Equation 2 of Section 3.2 guarantees that the secret
S that would be computed by a genuine tag can also be computed as
S =
N(N−1)⊕
i=0
aiSi.
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The attacker will be able to extract the correct authentication token from S
and fool the Interrogator with 100% certainty.
As described, the attack requires that the Interrogator choose a public key
with σI = σ. At first sight, for the parameters in [25], it appears that since
N ! ≈ 221.8 the probability a genuine Interrogator chooses the hoped-for σI
is around 2−21.8. However closer analysis reveals additional structure in the
conjugate sets C and D. In particular, all the permutations generated by C
have five fixed points, as do all the permutations generated by D. This means
that the space of possible permutations that might be encountered from a
genuine Interrogator is reduced from N ! to (N/2)! ≈ 27. The probability a
genuine Interrogator chooses the hoped-for σI is therefore greater than 2
−7.
For those that prefer certainty, it is obvious an attacker can increase his
success probability by performing more off-line interrogation of the target
Tag using different σ. This gives a variety of trade-offs, with the extreme
being an attacker who will be able to emulate the target tag with 100%
certainty after interrogating that tag around 91× 3× 5! < 215 times.
5 Tag private matrix recovery
The security of the Algebraic Eraser tag authentication protocol depends
on the secrecy of two components: the N × N private F256-matrix KT and
the tag string c ∈ F . In fact, both of these need to be kept secret: in the
section below we provide details of a very efficient tag impersonation attack
if KT is known; moreover, KT can be recovered from the public key if c is
known. In Section B.3 of [25] parameters are chosen so that the work effort
to recover KT by guessing the polynomial p(x) used to construct it is equal
to the claimed security level of 280 operations.
Exploiting the linearity observed in Equation 2 of Section 3.2 we show
how a differential cryptanalytic attack can recover the entirety of the secret
matrix KT after 11 tag authentications. Taking into account protocol con-
straints and parameters specified in [25] we will need 33 tag authentications
in practice, but in the following description we will set aside the factor of
three for clarity.
To begin, the attacker authenticates a target Tag using any Interrogator
public key (A, σ) and stores the shared secret S that results. The attacker
then authenticates the same tag with N related public keys that use the same
permutation σ and matrices P1, . . . , PN constructed as follows.
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Let Ei,j be the N ×N matrix that is all zero, except its (i, j) entry which
is 1. Set Pt = A ⊕ Et,N for 1 ≤ t ≤ N . The attacker challenges the target
tag with the ten public keys (Pt, σ), for 1 ≤ t ≤ N , and stores the secret
matrices St that result.
One can observe that S = KTAV and St = KTPtV , for 1 ≤ t ≤ N , where
the matrix V = φ(σ, c) will depend on σ and the Tag’s secret product c in a
complicated way; the last row of V is all zero, except its last entry which is
1, by a property of E-multiplication stated above. However neither Pt nor V
depend on KT and we observe that
S ⊕ St = (KTAV )⊕ (KTPtV ) = KT (A⊕ Pt)V = KTEt,NV.
Since the last row of V has a special form, S ⊕ St will be zero everywhere
except in the last column, for 1 ≤ t ≤ N . Further, the values in this last
column will correspond to the tth column of the tag secret matrix KT . Taken
together, the entirety of the tag secret matrix KT can be recovered column-
by-column and something that is intended to require 280 operations can be
accomplished with negligible work after N + 1 = 11 interactions with the
target Tag, or 33 tag authentications if we take into account the protocol
constraints in [25].
This attack has been confirmed using the parameters and examples given
in [25]. It has also been confirmed on parameter sets of the form B16F256
that have been supplied by SecureRF. In this latter case, with N=16, we are
required to perform 17 interactions with the target Tag, or 136 tag authen-
tications if we respect protocol considerations and only recover at most 255
bits in each interaction. Recall that parameter sets of the form B16F256 are
intended to provide 128-bit security.
The linearity property that facilitates this attack appears intrinsic to the
definition of the Algebraic Eraser and thus hard to avoid; increasing the size
of parameters will not provide any significant additional security.
6 Efficient tag impersonation
Even though the tag impersonation attack of Section 4 is already very ef-
fective, a more efficient attack can be designed using the result of Section 5.
This new attack is more efficient in terms of all three measures of tag queries,
computation, and storage.
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Algorithm 1 Constructing a lookup table
1: Construct a table indexed by the N ! permutations in Sym(N), with all
entries empty.
2: Add ‘terminate’ to the entry corresponding to the identity permutation.
3: Let L be a list that contains just the identity permutation.
4: while L non-empty do
5: Let g be the first element in L.
6: for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 32} and e ∈ {−1, 1} do
7: Compute ggei .
8: if the table entry indexed by ggei is still empty then
9: Change this entry to (i, e).
10: Add ggei to L.
11: Remove g from L.
Recall that d1, d2, . . . , d32 ∈ F are the interrogator conjugates. Define
their corresponding permutations gi ∈ Sym(N) by gi = pi(di). We already
observed in Section 4 that these permutations are highly structured and have
five fixed points.
Stage 0: A pre-computation stage. Build an oracle which, when given a
permutation σ ∈ Sym(N) that lies in the subgroup of Sym(N) generated by
the gi, returns r (a small integer), i1, i2, . . . , ir ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 32} and 1, . . . , r ∈
{−1, 1} such that
σ = g1i1 g
2
i2
· · · grir .
Since N ! = 10! ≤ 222, we can build a very efficient oracle by constructing
a lookup table of size N ! which contains the pair ir and r for each per-
mutation σ that can be written as a product of the gi (and a termination
string for the identity permutation). The table may be constructed by using
Algorithm 1.
Since each permutation g is added to the list L at most once, constructing
the table takes at most about N !× 32× 2 ≈ 228 operations. Once the table
is constructed, the oracle works on input σ by using the table to find the last
element in a product of the permutations gi and their inverses that is equal
to σ. It then multiplies σ by the inverse of this last element, and iterates
until it reaches the identity permutation. The oracle returns the shortest
expression of the form we want (though we do not need this). The oracle
is very efficient: just a few table lookups and permutation compositions are
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needed.
The subgroup generated by the permutations gi in [25] is extremely small
(as these permutations all fix the same five points). So building the table for
the oracle above is extremely fast. We have implemented Algorithm 1 in C.
It takes just 0.014 seconds to generate the table, and resulting oracle takes
an average of under 0.00005 seconds to answer typical query, running on a
2.7GHz i7 MacBook Pro. So the pre-computation stage takes a negligible
time to complete, and the resulting oracle is extremely fast in practice.
Note that Algorithm 1 and the resulting oracle are very efficient even if
the permutations di generate the whole of the symmetric group (the worst
case for the pre-computation). Experiments with our implementation show
that the table is constructed in 66 seconds, and the resulting oracle answers a
typical query in an average of under 0.0015 seconds. So the pre-computation
is always efficient.
For situations where it becomes impossible to store (in RAM) a table
of length equal to the order of the subgroup generated by the permutations
gi, for example if N is much larger, we would suggest first using standard
Schreier–Sims techniques (see Seress [26, Chapter 4], for example) and then
the powerful heuristic approach of Kalka, Teicher and Tsaban [21], to con-
struct the oracle. Note that the pre-computed oracle can be used whenever
the same set of reader conjugates are used. Since the reader conjugate set D
is a public system parameter [25] an oracle can be collaboratively computed
and shared over the Internet.
Stage 1: Interact with the Tag as in Section 5 to obtain the Tag’s public
key (MT , σT ) and then its secret key KT .
Stage 2: Impersonate the Tag using the techniques of Phase 2 of the
attack of Kalka, Teicher and Tsaban [21, Section 3.2.2]. The details are as
follows.
When a legitimate interrogator queries (MI , σI), query the oracle to ob-
tain i1, i2, . . . , ir ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 32} and 1, . . . , r ∈ {−1, 1} such that
σI = g
1
i1
g2i2 · · · grir .
Define
w = d1i1d
2
i2
· · · drir .
Compute the matrix L1 that is the result of the following E-multiplication:
(KTMI , σI) ∗ w−1.
15
Compute the matrix L2 that is the result of the following E-multiplication:
(K−1T MT , σT ) ∗ w.
The shared key is (L1L2, σTσI). This derivation has been implemented and
confirmed.
7 Full private key recovery
Given the extreme effectiveness of the tag impersonation attack of Section 6
the need for a full key recovery attack on the Algebraic Eraser tag authen-
tication protocol is questionable. Under normal circumstances one might
prefer a key-recovery attack so that recovered keys could be inserted into a
cloned device, thereby exploiting the storage and performance advantages of
the original algorithm. However, in our attacks, the pre-computed look-up
table is small and impersonation is exceptionally fast; in fact it would be
interesting to compare the performance of the impersonation attack to the
computation required by the legitimate tag.
Nevertheless, to illustrate that a complete key recovery attack does exist
we outline a basic attack using a meet-in-the-middle technique. While the
attack in this section is already very effective (248 storage and 249 time for
one of the parameter choices proposed for standardization) we believe that
more analysis could reveal more practical variants.
To start, we will say that Tag conjugate products c, c′ ∈ F are equivalent,
which we write as c ≡ c′, if
(I, 1) ∗ c = (I, 1) ∗ c′
where I is the N×N identity matrix and where 1 is the identity permutation.
The definition of E-multiplication shows that when V is any fixed invertible
matrix c ≡ c′ if and only if
(V, 1) ∗ c = (V, 1) ∗ c′.
In particular, when V = KT and c are the two components of the Tag private
key, a private key consisting of KT and c
′ will produce the same Tag public
key if, and only if, c ≡ c′ (because KT is invertible). Since all shared keys
can be derived from the public key and the interrogator’s secret information,
replacing c by c′ in the Tag makes no difference to any of the shared keys
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computed by the Tag in the protocol. So to recover the full secret key of the
Tag we need only find c′ ∈ F that is equivalent to c.
Assume that the Tag’s secret product c of conjugates has length 16, as
allowed by [25]. There are 2 × 32 = 26 possibilities for each term in the
product, and so there are 26×16 = 296 possibilities for c. We now describe a
simple meet-in-the-middle technique that will recover an equivalent product
c′ using a look-up table with
√
296 = 248 entries. The attack extends in a
natural way to longer products of conjugates.
Suppose now that an attacker has recovered the Tag private matrix KT
by the attack of Section 5. Clearly the attacker has the Tag’s public key
(MT , σT ). The attacker then searches for products c
′ ∈ F of Tag conjugates
that are equivalent to c by finding c′ such that (KT , 1) ∗ c′ = (MT , σT ). We
write c′ = w′1(w
′
2)
−1 where the wi are length eight products of Tag conjugates
and their inverses. Note that
(KT , 1) ∗ w′1 = (MT , σT ) ∗ w′2.
For each of the 248 possibilities for w′1, we compute (KT , 1) ∗ w′1. We store
the results in such a way that it is easy to find w′1 if we are given (KT , 1)∗w′1.
For example, we could use an array of pairs ((KT , 1) ∗ w′1, w′1), sorted by its
first component.
For each of the 248 possibilities for w′2, we compute (MT , σT ) ∗ w2 and
check whether this value occurs as the first of a pair in our array. Once we
find such a value w2, we set c
′ = w′1(w
′
2)
−1 where w′1 is the second element of
the pair we have found in the array. Note that
(KT , 1) ∗ c′ = ((KT , 1) ∗w′1) ∗ (w′2)−1 = ((MT , σT ) ∗w′2) ∗ (w′2)−1 = (MT , σT ),
and so c′ and KT form a private key that produces the Tag’s public key.
Hence c ≡ c′, and we have found an equivalent private key for the Tag.
Small-scale variants of this attack—using a reduced Tag conjugate set C
and shorter products—have been successfully implemented for the parameter
sets B10F256 given in [25].
8 Conclusion
The Algebraic Eraser has been on the periphery of the cryptographic liter-
ature for nearly ten years. However the designers have not made it easy for
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independent researchers to analyze the scheme. The reason for this approach
is unclear, but the consequence has been a lack of independent peer-review.
It is too soon to determine whether or not secure schemes can be built
around the mechanisms seen in the Algebraic Eraser. Certainly it is always
interesting to see new techniques based on different hard problems. But
any performance claims for the Algebraic Eraser are premature without a
more complete understanding of the security that is delivered. The work
of Ben-Zvi et al [7] and that presented in this paper suggest that a lack
of independent analysis has hindered the algorithm proponents from seeking
out alternative viewpoints and, critically, from recognizing some very effective
attacks. These have only become apparent as the profile of the algorithm has
been raised and details about the algorithm have been made public.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Algebraic Eraser should not
be used or standardized in its current form. If future versions are proposed,
and [5] provides hints that this may be the case, then it is important that
a full and detailed specification be made publicly available. Just as for the
parent algorithm, we believe any variants should not be used until there has
been sufficient independent public cryptanalysis.
References
[1] M. A˚gren, M. Hell, T. Johansson, and W. Meier. Grain-128a: A New
Version of Grain-128 with Optional Authentication, International Jour-
nal of Wireless and Mobile Computing, 5, (1), pp. 48–59, Inderscience,
2011.
[2] I. Anshel, D. Atkins, D. Goldfeld and P. Gunnels. Defeating the Ben-
Zvi, Blackburn, and Tsaban Attack on the Algebraic Eraser. Available
at http://arxiv.org/pdf/1601.04780v1.pdf. Also available at http:
//eprint.iacr.org/2016/044.pdf.
[3] I. Anshel, M. Anshel, D. Goldfeld and S. Lemieux. Key
agreement, the Algebraic Eraser and Lightweight Cryptogra-
phy. Contemporary Mathematics 418 (2006), 134. Also avail-
able at www.securerf.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/
SecureRF-Technical-White-Paper-06-with-Appendix-A-B.pdf.
18
[4] D. Atkins. Algebraic Eraser: A lightweight, efficient asymmetric key
agreement protocol for use in no-power, low-power, and IoT devices.
Available at csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/lwc-workshop2015/papers/
session8-atkins-paper.pdf.
[5] D. Atkins and D. Goldfeld. Addressing the Algebraic Eraser
Diffie?Hellman over-the-Air Protocol. Pre-print. Available at http:
//eprint.iacr.org/2016/205.pdf.
[6] D. Atkins and P.E. Gunnells. Algebraic Eraser: A lightweight, effi-
cient asymmetric key agreement protocol for use in no-power, low-
power, and IoT devices. Available at csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/
lwc-workshop2015/presentations/session8-atkins-gunnell.pdf.
[7] A. Ben-Zvi, S.R. Blackburn, and B. Tsaban. A Practical Cryptanalysis
of the Algebraic Eraser. October 7, 2015. Pre-print. Available at http:
//eprint.iacr.org/2015/1102.
[8] A. Bogdanov, L.R. Knudsen, G. Leander, C. Paar, A. Poschmann,
M.J.B. Robshaw, Y. Seurin, and C. Vikkelsoe. present: An Ultra-
Lightweight Block Cipher. In P. Paillier and I. Verbauwhede, edi-
tors, Proceedings of CHES 2007, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 4727, 450–466, Springer, 2007.
[9] Cryptography Stack Exchange. Posting http:
//crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/30644/
status-of-algebraic-eraser-key-exchange November 18, 2015.
[10] W. Diffie and M. Hellman. New Directions in Cryptography. IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory. IT-22, (6), pp. 644–654, IEEE,
1976.
[11] EPCglobal. EPC Radio Frequency Identity Protocols, Generation 2
UHF RFID. Specification for RFID Air Interface Protocol for Commu-
nications at 860 MHz-960 MHz Version 2.0.1. Available via www.gs1.
org/gsmp/kc/epcglobal/uhfc1g2.
[12] D. Goldfeld and P. Gunnells, Defeating the Kalka–Teicher–Tsaban linear
algebra attack on the Algebraic Eraser, Arxiv eprint 1202.0598, February
2012.
19
[13] P. Gunnells, On the cryptanalysis of the generalized simultaneous con-
jugacy search problem and the security of the Algebraic Eraser, arXiv
eprint 1105.1141, May 2011.
[14] ISO/IEC 29167-10:2015 – Information technology – Automatic identi-
fication and data capture techniques – Part 10: Crypto suite AES-128
security services for air interface communications.
[15] ISO/IEC 29167-11:2014 – Information technology – Automatic identifi-
cation and data capture techniques – Part 11: Crypto suite PRESENT-
80 security services for air interface communications.
[16] ISO/IEC 29167-13:2015 – Information technology – Automatic identifi-
cation and data capture techniques – Part 13: Crypto suite Grain-128a
security services for air interface communications.
[17] ISO/IEC 29167-12:2015 – Information technology – Automatic identi-
fication and data capture techniques – Part 12: Crypto suite ECC-DH
security services for air interface communications.
[18] ISO/IEC 29167-16 – Information technology – Automatic identification
and data capture techniques – Part 16: Crypto suite ECDSA-ECDH
security services for air interface communications.
[19] ISO/IEC 29167-17:2015 – Information technology – Automatic identifi-
cation and data capture techniques – Part 17: Crypto suite cryptoGPS
security services for air interface communications.
[20] ISO/IEC 29167-20 – Information technology – Automatic identification
and data capture techniques – Part 20: Crypto suite Algebraic Eraser
security services for air interface communications. Working Draft.
[21] A. Kalka, M. Teicher and B. Tsaban, Short expressions of permuta-
tions as products and cryptanalysis of the Algebraic Eraser, Advances
in Applied Mathematics 49 (2012), 57–76.
[22] A. Myasnikov and A. Ushakov, Cryptanalysis of the Anshel-Anshel-
Goldfeld-Lemieux Key Agreement Protocol’, Groups Complexity Cryp-
tology 1 (2009), 63–75.
20
[23] National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS 197: Advanced
Encryption Standard, November 2001.
[24] SecureRF Corporation. Corporate materials. Available via www.
securerf.com.
[25] SecureRF Corporation. Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication. October
5, 2015. Available at www.securerf.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/
10/Algebraic_Eraser_Over-the-Air_-Authentication.pdf. Also
posted at [9].
[26] A´kos Seress, Permutation Group Algorithms, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003.
21
